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Introduction 
This paper reports on a research programme into the growth of secondary industry in 
South Africa immediately after the revision of the tariff in 1925. The aim is a 
broad sketch more than a presentation of results. The numerical calculations, e.g. 
of output growth, tariff levels and rate changes between 1924 and 1939, are 
incomplete. With access to other sources (l), these are likely to be revised, and 
the figures appearing in the tables below should be read as preliminary. Two further 
points are needed by way of introduction: first, this forms part of a larger study 
of industrial growth in the period spanning the two world wars; secondly, the work 
on related questions, notably theses by Kaplan (2), Davies and others, has been 
accessible only recently and has not been consulted. 
A setting for the research work reported here is the following. Given the 
aggregate volume of investment in the South African economy in the early nineteen- 
twenties, and therefore the rate of accumulation, its pattern was believed such as to 
generate a reserve army of black and white labour. The stated purpose of the tariff 
revision of 1925 was to alter this pattern by raising the prospective value-added - 
the source of accumulation - in manufacturing activities. (value-added is an 
industry's output mirms the goods and services bought from other industries - fuel, 
power, intermediate inputs - and used up in the course of production.) One intended 
consequence was absorption of the white labour surplus. This is by and large the 
conventional perspective, variously labelled. Another presented in recent years 
argues that the primaxy objective of the reformed tariff was the purposive bias in 
the accumulation process itself. Far from protection merely being an instrumental 
means to the ultimate goal of employment creation - and therefore in potential 
substitutable by other means like subsidies, tax and credit incentives, or state 
investment - it was itself the object of the exercise. Agricultural and manufacturing 
capital, so runs this hypothesis, were the recipients and had a material interest in 
the diversion towards their sectors of more investible surplus. 
This antithesis is too stark. First, any secondaqy industrialization 
process has in potential a realisation problem: where and to whom are its products 
to be sold so that in turn they generate surplus for conversion into investment and 
capitalists' consumption in the accumulation cycle? Apaxt from export of manufactures, 
an option not open in the circumstances of the inter-war years, demand had to come 
from the agricultural, mining and services sectors (the exogenous component) and, 
there is reason to argue, in addition from the expanded wage employment of whites 
within manufacturing (the endogenous component). The consumption of black wage- 
earners also was not negligible, in particular for clothing, textiles, tobacco, 
certain processed foods, fuels and utensils, but the asgument turns principally upon 
the "a~to-demand~~ of white industrial workers. This is speculative. Testing the 
proposition requires a close look at the composition of manufacturing output by use - 
wage goods, durable consumer goods, intermediate inputs, capital equipment - and by 
destination. This is not easy, as explained later, but it suffices to note that the 
endogenous demand, a function of manufacturing's own size of labour force and wage 
structure, may be a key factor. 
Secondly, we need reminding that factory production becomes feasible only 
when a pool of labour without independent means comes into existence. Had poor whites 
surplus on the land or informally employed or on poor relief not been available, would . 
the scale of manufacturing expansion that occurred still have been attainable? By the 
early twenties a second generation black proletariat resident in towns and cities was 
in the making, and a skilled stratum in the ports possessed an earlier provenance. 
There is little systematic information about recruitment to the South African workshop 
and factory, less than to the mine and the famn. But, to adopt the counterfactual 
mode, had a supply of free white labour not emerged is it plausible to suppose that 
the same pace of growth and range of output would have occurred in the sector prior 
to World War II? The question is complex. It turns upon the relationship between 
cost and productivity in the employer's perception of the labour available, and upon 
variables like the differential mobility of black and white labour,. their access to 
formal education, housing and health status, not to speak of docility and discipline. 
Thirdly, there is not one-way causation between capital formation and 
industrial output with the former a precondition for the latter. This is the 
perspective appropriate to the phase of primitive accumulation, i.e. the transfer and 
concentration in control and ownership of productive assets. But it does not fit the 
period under discussion. We can speak as justifiably of capital accumulation resulting 
from industrial development (3) ,  and in certain circumstances the volume of investment 
determines the rate of savings rather than the other way round in a profit-seeking 
system. Those circumstances have to do with the autonomous role of expectations and 
the "state of business and confidence". The aspect relevant here is that the source 
of accumulation in an economic sector and the control of net increments to it may not 
be the strategic factors for study. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. The second section presents 
an economic profile of the twenties and the third an account of the industrialization 
debate. Next, the industrial structure, 1924-1939, is described, and finally there is 
discussion of the tariff, of the concepts of nomind and effective rates of protection, 
and the kinas of inferences these may yield for the questions just raised. 
Economic Profile of the Twenties 
Industrial growth during World War I was ,in large part a response to 
fortuitous protection: that is, import substitution was forced by the incapacity 
of foreign suppliers, mainly British, to meet orders and by lack of shipping space for 
civilian goods. Thus the war created a captive market for certain consumer goods, 
predominantly processed food, clothing and footwear. It also stimulated a great volume 
of repair work, the output of one-off replacements by the engineering industry, as well 
as intermediate inputs for construction, like cement, lime, bricks and timber. The 
volume increase in sectoral output, 1916/17 to l920/2l, has been calculated at 43% 
(~earsall, 1937 : 414). 
But the war interrupted the flow of needed capital goods and intermediate 
goods imports, thus having, too, a negative effect. Overall, the level of capital 
formation relative to what might have been achieved in peace-time may have been lower. 
Furthemore, social overhead investment - transport, communications, power, water and 
public construction - probably marked time and therefore inhibited manufacturing 
growth in the first post-war years. These propositions are purposely tentative. This 
entire episode in South African indus.trial history needs investiga.tion, with leads 
from the mixed experience of allies and of non-belligerents like Argentina and 
Brazil. (4) What will prove decisive in assessing whether the changes were, on 
balance, stimulating or retarding to the sector's accumulation is the role of war-time 
inflation and the increased profits generated. 
The hediate post-waz years are less ambiguous. With the resumption of 
international trading, new and old manufacturing branches dike experiencedcold winds and 
agitated for protection. In the Department of Mines and Industries a policy committee 
writing five years later claimed that a "special degree3' of economic disruption had 
been inflicted upon South Africa by conditions of war and transition. (5) The 
inflationary boom and slump 1919-22 was in certain respects more violent than 1929-32, 
with a fall in national income at current prices of 2g0/o compased with 15.4% in the 
latter depression (Frankel & Herzfeld, 1944). Of course, in terms of unemployment, 
lost production and therefore material disruption, this comparison was reversed. But 
thezapidity of change in prices, wages, interest rates and other financial indicators 
generated an economic psychosis, a "crisis of confidence", the lever which capitalists 
wield to persuade governments into certain courses of action or abstention. 
For this paper's purpose it is unnecessary to present data on major economic 
indices for the decade. There is little. Yet the standard figures on incomes and 
wages are a salutary reminder that,for fully the first two decades after Union, 
material gains achieved by wage labour of any colour were either meagre or non- 
existent. (6) Tables 1 and 2 contain, respectively, income per capita figures 1911/12 
to 1945/46, and indexes of real wages paid to white workers in different sectors 
1910-35. (7) 
In the language of the business cycle, March 1922 to August 1929 was a 
"major upward swing" (8) when monitored by time series like volume of imports, railm 
revenue, bank cleasings, coal sales, transfer duty on property and share prices. 
Equally, however,the twenties as a whole has been labelled ''a decade of stagnation, 
conflict and economic re-assessmentw (Hobart Houghton & Dagut 61973, 111: 31 ) . Both 
descriptions are valid, depending upon whose perspective is implicit. The wage 
movements exhibited in Table 1 - an 11% rise in the aggregate index 1920-30 - do not 
conflict with the possibility of considerable growth in profits, rents and agricultural 
incomes. What is indicated, taking the figures at face value, is that during the first 
twenty yeam the fruits of national sovereignty filtered down to the mass of white 
wage-earners in the magnitude of a.l% real ga;in Whether and what workers of other skin 
colours gained in this time is unknown, and probably unknowable. 
On the dimension of unemployment there are no quantitative estimates from 
official sources for the twenties. Monitoring of white unemployment commenced with 
the 1929-32 depression, that of llColouredl' and "Asianw workers later, while the first 
estimate for Africans from a stote agency appeared in 1977. Employment indices in 
three broad sectors are available from 1922: manufacturing, including construction; 
electricity, transportation and railway construction; and mining and metallurgical 
works. They have use as cyclical indicators and possibly as guides to demand pressure 
in their respective labour markets, but in charting the trend of unemployment their 
value is limited. (9) 
Widening the concept to include underemployment compounds the empirical 
difficulties. This is curious in that a dozen state commissions, and one semi-official 
one, in the period 1908-32 were directed in their terms of reference to enquire into 
the welfare and. poverty status of whites. (10) Others - investigations into marginal 
mines and cost of living, for instance - also addressed this question, thou& 
indirectly. None of these produced hard figures. Concern, it goes without saying, 
was confined to whites aYld a miniscule fraction of the llColouredll population. The 
distress of Africans linked to worklessness impinged upon official and public 
consciousness only in the depths of the thirties depression (11) (the Native Economic 
Commission reported a decade later than the time under discussion),. 
Table 3 lists the familiar estimates of poor white numbers and their 
designations. No independent assessment of such aggmgated figures, utilizing primary 
material and alternative assumptions, appears to be available for %hem years. At 
best they are indicative of orders of magnitude. 'Nothing in this paper turns on 
numerical precision and the documents selected and quoted below convey merely the 
flavour of the white unemployment issue in the early twenties. 
First, the 1924 comrnittee,previously cited, calculated that' 
The annual accessions to the European male labour force 
in the Union number about 16,000 boys who in each year 
attain the age of 18 years. Of this number 8,000 are 
required to make good losses in the labour force due to 
deaths and age; the remaining 8,000 can only be absorbed 
by the extension of the existing fields of employment ... 
The development of industry might enable us not only to 
absorb our own natGal increase, but to provide a field 
for aided &migration . . . land] at the same time render 
, 
'it more easy to absorb in useful emplabent numbers of 
poor whites, a class of which under present conditions 
the country has almost come to despair. 
(~eport of Committee upon anaEconomic Policy for the Union, 
1924.) 
Secondly, early in the same year before the election that brought the Pact 
to power, a decision was taken to expand railway absorption of unskilled white labour. 
Under the new government it was applied vigorously. 
No effort was spared in absorbing the unemployed in 
replacement of native labourers and figures soared. 
From 6 3,200 at the end of 19231 the figure rose 
sharply in 1924 to 6,363 and to nearly 11,000 in 1926; 
it remained in the vicinity of 12,000 during the years 
of economic~depression ddthen showed an upward trend 
to just over 15,000 in 1939. 
(south African Railways 6194.7 : 30, 31) 
And, as is well known, part of the civilized labour package entailed similar steps of 
black displacement in public enterprises in the manufacturing sector: see Table 4, 
last column. 
Thirdly, the petition reproduced as Appendix 1 is probably an isolated case. 
Nevertheless, it-gives a lead to what was popularly believed about urban white 
unemployment, to presumptions about the state's role, and to the pressures upon 
legislators for relief. (12) 
The Industrialization Debate 
The opposed positions, for and against the purgosive fostering of 
manufacturing activity in South Africa, had their counterparts abroad. Indeed, in. - 
large part their intellectual content was acquired from there, and similar debates 
were in process in other "intermediate industrializers" like Canada, Australia, and 
Argentina. (13) While it is not feasible to characterize all  these currents of 
opinion, some did in the early inter-war years comprise the essential background to 
the domestic debate. 
In all the major capitalist countries the watchword 
of internal economic policy during the immediate post- 
Armistice months was tde-control'. The sane conception 
underlay the general approach to the international 
economic problems during the whole of the immediate 
post-war period. In so far as any general principle 
guided the actions that were taken for world economic 
reconstruction, it was the speediest possible 
restoration of the liberal world economic system which 
had existed during the nineteenth century. To point out 
this intellectual failure [to realize that the world 
required more positive action than the speediest possible 
removal of all impediments to and controls of private 
enterprise] is not to deny that the adoption of this 
policy was, historically, due to the fact that political 
power in most of the important countries was in the hands 
of those who, rightly or wrongly, believed that their 
interests demanded the minimum of State interference in 
economic affairs. 
(Arndt 61944: 223, fn. l].) 
Orthodox thinking on economic policy in South Africa subscribed to this 
benign and optimistic view. Capitalists, the managerial stratum, civil servants and 
journalists along with many trades union officials, politicians and academics worked 
within a common framework of economic thought and financial practice. That the 
international division of labour, if unfettered, would maximize the collective net 
advantages of trade and investment flows between metropolitan centre and the 
periphery was a shamd. presupposition. Another was that interests and goals were at 
base complementary. Conflict in the domestic economy was manageable in the way it 
appeared to be under British capitalism. What was characteristic of this time, even 
more than of our own experience of the managed market system and American dominance of 
international capitalism after 1945, was that events systematically slipped out of the 
intellectual frame. 
We find in the post-war [W] period an extraordinary 
divergence between the theories of economic experts and 
the practice of those responsible for the economic 
policies of their respective countries. Analysis will 
show that this divergence springs from a simple fact. 
The economic expert, dominated in the main by laissez- 
faire doctrine, considers the hypothetical economic 
interest of the world as a whole, and is content to 
assume that this is identical with the interest of each 
individual country. The politician pursues the concrete 
interest of his country, and assumes (if he makes any 
assumption at all) that the interest of the world as a 
whole is identical with it. Nearly every pronouncement 
of every international economic conference held since the 
War has been initiated by this assumption that there is 
some ~solu-bion~ or 'plant which, by a judicious balancing 
of interests, will be equally favourable to all and 
prejudicial to none. 
i Parallels and contrasts at this general level can be questionable. Nevertheless, it helps to think ourselves back sixty years, first, by contrasting what 
happened after the two world wars and, secondly, by posing the question whether the 
confrontations of the inter-war years that marked exchange between nations - the 
t1politici5ation of traden - were the norm or the exception. There is no ambiguity about 
the contrasted trends of trade and output growth and their switch round at World 
War 11. In the period 1913-1948 world production rose at an annual rate of 2% while 
world trade grew by only 0.5%, whereas in the subsequent twenty-five years, 1948-1973, 
world production w w  by 5% per year and world trade by 7% (ENlD0 l1979: 15, fn.21). 
The international trade system established outside the socialist bloc in the 
late 1940~~ exemplified by institutions like the GATT and the IMF, was a creature of 
the preponderant weight of one capitalist power. America, we are told, replaced "the 
thigh politics' of interstate relations with the 'low politicsf of commercial exchanges 
among private producers and consumers" (~arnecke 61978: 31 ) . This system - hardly 
*freeu trade - by the early seventies was in dissolution for manifold reasons, and 
currently we are witnessing perhaps the return of "normaln trading conditions between 
nations, more like the years between the wars. (14) In place of the old protectionism 
resting on tasiffs, the new protectionism is characterized by quantitative restrictions 
on trade, by state aids of all kinds to domestic industry, and by export 
restraints on the part of developing countries. I 
1 
The bearing of these observations on the South African debate is t h r o w  the 
argument that the international context made the time exceedingly unpmpitious for a 
small country to remain open. Given its premises and high abstraction (which is to 
SW nothing about its realism or ideological status), the free .trade argument is 
logically impregnable. But in a world of beggar-thy-neighbour actions - that is, the 
absence of free trade policies in other countries - the presumption in favour of free 
over restricted trade, or less over more restriction, falls away. When recognized this 
perception did not encompass issues like the best form of protection or which sectors 
of the economy should have been favoured, but it deflected that onus of proof the 
orthodox camp always thrust upon their opponents. Secondly, even if Afrikaner 
nationalism had not existed it would not have been necessary to invent it. A 
perfectly respectable case, by political, economic and intellectual criteria, could be 
constructed for autarchy and economic nationalism, as it was in Australia, Canada, 
Argentina and other intermediate industrializing countries. Carr evokes vividly the 
incoqmity between the h a m o q  of interest~~doctrine and the conditions of the time: 
in South Africa you did not need to be an Afrikaner intellectual or technocrat to I 
realize that l l 
Laissez-faire, in international relations as in those 
between capital and labour, is the paradise of the 
economically strong. State control, whether in the 
form of protective legislation or of protective 
tariffs, is the weapon of self-defence invoked by the 
economically weak. The clash of interests is real and 
inevitable; and the whole nature of the problem is 
distorted by an attempt to disguise it. 
The remainder of this section lists differentiating features of the two 
sides in the policy debate from the vantage point of the present. The orthodox or 
mainstream position and the bases of its support h m  been identified at length in 
writings of the past decade (some in this seminar series). For the present it 
suffices to note: 
fundamental oppositton to state enterprise (15); 
( ii) a wholly benign attitude to foreign investment, including complete 
freedom in repatriation of profits and capital transactions across 
the frontiers ; 
(iii) a conception of the desired development path as export-propelled 
growth in a laissez-faire environment with the sources of dynamism 
overwhelmingly external; 
the gold standard mechanism centred upon London - "an organic part 
of our economic system11, wrote the 1932 Select Committee - was 
invested with an inordinate degree of political and intellectual 
commitment: no gap between rationalizing model and practice was 
recognized (16) ; 
the expansion of secondary industry was to be paced by the growth 
of domestic markets and its range by the countryls resource 
endowment (17) - a process of (import-swallowingl as distinct from 
import-substitutionf , in Hirschmanf S terminology (1968). 
These features, as with those of the state capitalist model below, are 
purposely general and schematic in presentation to highlight the differences. Also, 
it hardly needs saying, once in power the Pact and its ideological successors took 
over these tenets plus minor ones not listed, and remained less squeamish only about 
state enterprise and conscious manipulation of the tariff. There were attempts in 
the early twenties at a synthesis of both sides. Perhaps the most interesting example 
was van der Byl, the Scientific and Technical Adviser and first of the new Afrikaner 
technocrats. Like his functional ancestors two decades earlier, the social engineers 
involved in state-building under Lord Milner (18), he viewed the issues in markedly 
pragmatic and rationalist terms - the llnational interest'" and appeared perplexed at 
the Smuts government's incapacity or unwillingness to share this perspective, as these 
passages indicate. 
It is recognised that there are certain forms of State 
aid which involve questions of policy. But there are 
also other forms of State aid which it is the duty of 
Government to furnish. It is with these that I am 
concerned in this report. I have in mind certain lines 
of action which, it seems, the Government should take 
if our industries are to undergo the developments which 
we hope for ... of the utmost importance to our economic 
future. We cannot afford to waste time in this matter 
for several reasons. In the first place the gold mines 
which form a not inconsiderable portion of the industrial 
activities of South Africa are beginning to close down, 
and we do not know how long it will be before the 
majority of them will be mere memories of the past. If 
we aspire to anything approaching economic independence, 
we cannot rely entirely on our agricultural industries, 
but must pave the w a ~  for development of manufacturing 
industries, one effect of which will be to absorb a large 
proportion of the labour that will be liquidated by the 
closing down of the mines. Secondly, the extraordinary 
economic conditions occasioned abroad by the war have 
afforded this country opportunities for developing its 
manufacturing industries in a manner which, before the 
war, was probably regarded as impossible . . . We have 
passed beyond the stage that reqvdres lengthy investigation 
into the plausibility of Government participating in 
activities intended to stimulate industrial development 
in the Union. We know that something must be done and 
what we need now are the outlines of a concrete plan of 
procedure ... 
So he wrote in lhrch 1921, and went on to urge the establishment of a Customs Tasiff 
Board. Two yeazs later his frustration is breaking through the surface. 
I m a y  state that the time I have been in charge of the 
Industries Division has been a trying and to me a very 
disappointing one. I realize that the country has been 
in a difficult financial position during the past two or 
three years, but at the same time I feel that the 
Government should make a special effort to assist in the 
development of a line of activities which seems to be 
absolutely necessary if the country is to develop along 
right lines. As compared with other countries, South 
Africa should be in a state of industrial development 
which is,compa,ra,tively speaking, very high ... In every 
nation, there is a class of people who possess 
practically no initiative ... To provide work for these 
white people as well as the coloured population requires 
a proportionate amount of manufacturing industrial 
activity ... It is futile to talk of putting these people 
on the land . . . The only means of absorbing the lab6ur 
represented by this class is in manufacturing 
industries, where they can do prescribed routine work. 
The presence of the coloured and native population 
makes it difficult to absorb them in domestic service 
and farm labour ... While a proportion of the development 
should be done by private initiative the Government should 
not neglect to do its share ... In laying the foundation 
of the Industries Department, I have carefully borne in 
mind the extent to which the Government could be expected 
to go in fostering the development of industries. Private 
enterprise must learn to do something for itself (and our 
manufacturers have a lot to learn) but the limit of the 
scope of Government assistance has not by a n ~ r  means been 
reached. This is evident when the activities of this 
department are compared with those of similar departments 
in other countries. 
(van der By1 61921, 19231 a )  
I do not intend to discuss whether "state capitalist" is an appropriate 
label for the set of beliefs characterized below, or whether lfintementionist" or some 
neutral term would be more apt. They meet the general criteria usually adduced. (19) 
Furthermore, were the emergence of undeniably state capitalist forms after World War 
11, progressively widening and deepening ever since, not to have had their provenance 
in policy thinking two decades earlier, this would be astonishing. Features like the 
technocratic monopoly acquired by the Industrial Development Corporation, its 
satellites and other public corporations,in which capital accumulation came to assume 
independent power in the hands of top administrators, would then be difficult to 
explain. Or, alternatively, credence would be lent to myth-making where such phenomena 
are viewed as part of the "logicn of economic development and of the country's geo- 
political environment. 
The 'state capitalist model rested upon the following presumptions: 
(i) By the mid-twenties an overwhelming need existed to diversify 
employment opportunities for whites, given the saturation of 
mining and agriculture. 
(ii) The natural resource endowment, measured by existing and potential 
supplies of raw materials, made feasible an expanded range of 
manufacturing activities if accorded ffmoderaten protection or state 
initiation. 
(iii) Economies of scale were achievable in the output of certain consumer 
and intermediate goods by rationalisation, specialization and 
learning effects but which free importation had precluded. 
( iv> Autarchy was desirable in the harsh international climate after the 
World War; coupled to this was the notion of an "essential industry" 
for national sovereignty, like iron and steel and chemicals. 
(V) The fostering of positive expectations in the minds of industrial 
entrepreneurs via protection and anti-dumping provisions, guarantees, 
statements of intent, a d  the assiduous cultivation of a "climate of 
confidence" was essential. 
(4 Internal expenditure links from the ejrport sectors were being 
dissipated abroad in the absence of suitable policy safeguards. 
(vii) Extractive activity, particularly of gold, entailed a wasting asset : 
hence guiding market forces would ease the transition to a balanced 
productive structure containing a greater weight of secondary 
- industry. 
(viii) With the exception of South West Africa, newly mandated, the land 
frontier for capitalist agriculture was closed. 
(h) Urbanization and the rise of new social groups - indigenous 
entrepreneurs, expanding middle strata, including the petty-bourgeois 
segmant of ministers of religion, intellectuals, teachers, civil 
servants and white-collar salariat - who were articulate, vocal and 
as Afrikaners politically aware, together with the skill-less at the 
bottom of the white pyramid; both these trends made linear 
extrapolation of the mining-dominated economy problematical. 
(X) The prevailing distribution of the surplus was no longer defensible. 
That is, the old-style spoils system with its tripartite division 
between foreign and national capitalists, and the patronage dispensed 
in the state sector by the South African Party, widely countenanced 
as a creature of mining capital. 
(xi) The new technocrats subscribed to certain central tenets of state 
capitalism. There was the vision of a nclass-less modernisation 
without tearsff, and the premise that the state pursues ends which 
are not identical with those of a capitalist enterprise bent on 
profit maximization. 
(xii) Historical analogies with late industrializers like the United States 
and Germany and with the contemporary experience, particularly in 
tariff matters, of Canada and Australia were pervasive. Underlying 
these parallels waa the two-stage or fftextiles-firstlf supposition that 
industrialization usually proceeds in an evolutionary manner from 
single-use consumer goods to those of gz-ea,ter capital intensity, and 
eventually to intermediate and capital goods production. 
(xiii) In negotiation over access for non-gold exports to foreign markets 
South Africa had no bargaining counterwei&t in a world with 
escalating tariff barriers. Moreover, the absence of protective 
duties entailed being tied in the long term even tighter to the 
British apron strings. 
Changes in the Industrial Structure, 1924-1932 
Table 5 shows the enormous expansion of aggregate output, of both private 
and public establishments, in the manufacturing sector in the 15 years preceding World 
War 11. The boom after recovery from depression in 1932 has claim to be the most 
I spectacular in South African history. Interestingly, by international standards it 




The changed structure of these manufacturing activities can be viewed in 
, 
, different wws. In Table 6 the increment in employment and value-added has been 
broken down by industrial branch to show changing relative wei@ts, while Table 7 
I exhibits the branch composition of white employment and the ratio of black to white 
1 at the initial and terminal dates. (21) The branches which increased their percentwe 
I contribution to sectoral value-added, 1939 over 1924, were metals and engineering 
23.4 (21.0)~ power 10.2 (8.8), clothing and textiles 6.5 (4.0)~ cement, glass and 
ceramics 5.3 (5.0)~ vehicles 5.1 (2.7), wood products and furniture 4.7 (4.3) , and 
rubber products 2 .l (1.0). Those that Jo& weight were food, beverages and tobacco 
17.4 (22.5), building and construction 9.5 (12.8), printing and paper 6.3 (7.5), 
chemicals 5.9 (6.2) and leather products 2.8 (3.1). 
Kmajor limitationof output data at the branch level is that the mesh of the 
net is too large to answer analytical-questions about structural change. One c k o t  
discriminate easily between consumer goods (single-use and durable), intermediates (of 
varying fabrication levels) and capital goods, nor between heavy and light 
manufacturing (22), where the latter tends generally to require less capital per unit 
of output and per unit of labour employed, and lesser skills than the former. Another 
trend difficult to monitor is the degree of internation of the manufacturing sector, 
that is, the extent to which the industrialization process " t m m  inwardsn and 
produces inputs for other sectors and for itself (in the economists' jargon: where 
most cells of an input-output table are "non-empty") . 
A final limitation to be noted is that without disaggregated information 
one ciwvlot evaluate the repeated claims that South Africa's version of import- 
substitution industrialization (ISI) was a major success attributable to the rational 
and flmoderate" policies initiated after 1924. (23) Neither can underlying questions 
about the burdens of such a process be approached fruitfully. For example, the array 
of wage-goods on the frontier of import substitution changed in pattern and relative 
weight over time. Consequently, in so far as their prices rose relative to wage and 
other incomes (including subsistence) this bore down unequally upon different 
consumers at different times. 
The Tariff, 1924-1932 
This final section will not describe the inter-war tariff in detail, but 
rather make general observations about its functions as an interventionist device, 
introduce the idea of "effective protection", and discuss the rates on selected 
tariff items and their possible relationship to other variables like employment. 
The tariff arrangements preceding the major revision of 1925 are described 
in a number of sources. (24) What emerged that year from the reconstituted Board of 
Trade and Industries was by common consent still a hybrid, embodying the twin 
objectives of revenue and protection. While Australia, Canada and the United States 
were the models of "scientific tariff managementf1 urged by protectionists, their 
larger tax-paying populations provided an alternate base for generating tax revenue 
and gave these countries a latitude unavailable to South Africa. The lament that the 
revenue function tied their hands was a reiterated theme of the new technocrats until 
the mid-thirties, when the gold-price boom filled State coffers. The issue was by no 
means technical alone. First, for steady yield and low adminiskrative cost, customs 
duties should be levied upon a small range of mass consumption goods having few 
substitutes. (witness the dilemma of contemporary governments over tobacco: potent 
in the generation of cancer and of revenue.) Secondly, the state's expenditure 
obligations expanded greatly at this time (137% between 1927/28 and 1938/39), and 
disproportionately so to the agricultural sector whose share in the total out of 
ordinary revenue and loans rose from 18.6% to 32.5% between these dates. (ETI 61945: 
271 ) This trend was politically irreversible. 
Prior to 1930 sovereign governments other than the USSR had at hand few 
policy tools in peace time, though war was another matter as the directed economies 
of 1914-18 had demonstrated. Keynesian thinking lay ahead, and governments, owing to 
their gold standard commitment, had little control over their exchange rates, few had 
central banks or mature fiscal machinery, and in southern Europe and the present 
Third World large subsistence sectors and llimperfect" markets. That autonomy in 
tariff construction loomed large in the policy armoury is hardly surprising. (25) In 
addition, the tariff has always had a symbolic and cultural dimension. The same 
attitudes as in other countries experiencing industrial growth at this time cannot be 
postulated in South Africa without evidence, but there axe suggestive echoes. 
In the minds of most Argentines, exports are linked 
automatically to oligarchical and feudalistic r u ~ l  
ladlords allied with foreign interests, while 
protection is linked with import substitution, 
industrialization, nationalism, and social democracy. 
(~iaz-Ale jandro 61968: 941. ) 
The protectionist aims which the post-3925 tariff was deemed to embody - 
deemed, that is, by successive regimes acting on the advice of the Board of Trade and 
Industries and reflected in the series of legislative acts and amendments - are well 
knom. (26) The Board propounded a distinction between the lfprinciples underlying the 
tariffff and the criteria or fffactorsl' considered in applying these principles in 
concrete situations. Whether, in the key phxase, 'lsatisfactory labour conditionsf1 
actually were a principle (a central objective) or a factor (a desired joint-product), 
they were the distinguishing feature of the South African tariff between the wars. (27) 
Other national tariff systems had objectives ranging through diversification of the 
e~~nomic stmcture, support of the wage level and freedom from balance of payments 
pressures. But,with the possible exception of the Irish Republic, few appeas to have 
contained employment creation as an explicit aim, let alone for one target segment of 
the population. Orily after World War II did net increases in employment appear on 
tariff agenda generally. 
Though, as remarked in the introduction, how effective this principle-cum- 
criterion actually _was in South Africafs case is not a simple question. A normal 
import substitution strategy to force the pace of industrial expansion behind tariff 
walls, coupled fortuitously after 1932 to an export-propelled boom, mag have generated 
the same incremental demand for white labour evidenced in Table 5 without any explicit 
employment provision. 
In recent years the concept of effective protection has emerged in the 
international trade literature. The basic idea is to allow for (a) the additional 
cost to a manufacturing industry of having to purchase inputs (materials, equipment, 
machines) from other protected industries at prices reflecting their tariffs; and 
(b) the fact that the proportion of value-added to gross output differs between 
industries. The aim of every protective system is to raise the prospective value- 
added in the chosen industry above what it would otherwise be under free trade. For 
any given level of protection the smaller the ratio of value-added to output the 
g~eater the impact upon profitability. Calculations of effective rates thus are 
intended to measure the resource-allocation (or surplus diversion) effects of a 
tariff structure. (28) 
Table 8 contains a sample for certain product groups in the food and 
beverages branch. Nominal and effective rates are contrasted for 1924 and 1939, 
ranked from the hi&est of the latter. The table's purpose is to show that, althow 
nominal rates were increased substantially, doubling and trebling in some cases, the 
effective rates rose in a considerably smaller ratio or even declined. The 
explanation lies in the rates on major inputs to these industries listed at the 
bottom of the table. Clear examples ase sugar and. fresh and frozen meats. To protect 
the agricultural producers of these, the tariff rose from 1% to 76% a d  %l%, 
respectively. In consequence, the using industries - Confectionery, Canning, Baking 
and Processed Meat - had also to be granted increased protection. (29) 
These examples illustrate two general points. First, quite apart from the 
burden placed upon consumers, any given configuration of tariff rates designed to 
protect selected activities has multiple effects. Other industries and other sectors 
have costs imposed upon them in a direct manner (some, of course, also benefit by an 
expanded mket). Table 8 is a simple instance of tariff escalation, though the more 
usual case is where import substitution proceeds down the vertical structure towards 
more sophisticated inputs. An example would be not only cardboard cartons and packing 
but tin cans and, ultimately, capital equipment for the canning industry. To make 
production of the latter possible tariffs are levied, but then the nominal rate on the 
final commodity, jam or canned fruit, has to be raised further to offset these hi&er 
input prices. 
Secondly, tracing the mifications of such changes is hi&ly complex. No 
simple correlation of nominal rates and of their variation with, for instance, 
employment levels by industry is sufficient. Furthemore, though the tariff is 
essentially a device for socializing costs, or a portion of them, without socializing 
profits, on the premise that long~tem benefits accrue to ffsociety", no simple 
delineation of gainers from losers is defensible. Effective protection rates axe 
superior devices in this respect, though even here interpretation must be probabilistic 
and cautious. 
But these observations are no cause to infer that reseaxch into the 
tariff is unrewmding. A principal theme of this paper has been that many social 
forces converged upon the tariff in the inter-war years. It was the single most 
significant policy measure of the time. Any serious understanding of the processes 
of industrialization that shaped contemporary South Africa must encompass it as a 
major determinant. 
Notes 
For example, access to a full set of Board of Trade and Industries reports for 
the period is required. These provide an expanded range of cost, output and 
other information for selected industries. Data quoted in this paper have been 
drawn in the main from the Industrial Census, the Annual Statements of Trade and 
Shipping and the relevant Yeasbooks. 
The one exception is Kaplan (1976), a paper which covers ground related to this. 
Some of his inferences may conflict with present arguments, though perhaps not 
with the general tenor. 
"It is impossible ... to separate cause and effect: it is just as sensible - 
indeed more enli@tening - to say that capital accumulation has resulted from 
industrial development as that it was the cause of such development. For taking 
manufacturing activities as a whole, the growth of output and the accumulation 
of capital are merely different aspects of a single process. Capitalistic 
production is 'production of commodities by commodities'; individual industrial 
activities make use of goods produced by other industrial processes as their 
inputs, and provide outputs which (in the great majority of cases) serve as the 
inputs of further processes. (Kaldor 61977 : 193-41. ) 
Diaz-Ale jandro (1970) and Fishlow (1972). 
"The depression which has settled on nearly the whole world as the result of the 
war and of the general disturbance of political, social and industrial life which 
has followed appears to have affected South Africa in a special degree. As a 
consequence of this serious depression a considerable amount of unemployment 
exists in South Africa, especially amongst unskilled workers. The difficulty of 
the poor white problem, already sufficiently serious, has thus become accentuated. 
Government relief works in consequence exist on a large scale and involve 
considerable State expenditure. Nearly every class in the community has suffered 
in some degree as the result of existing economic conditions." Report of 
Committee upon an Economic Policy . . . (1924) 
This is an aggrega,tive statement quite compatible with real income rises for 
individual skill groups and sub-sectors. 
Kuc2;;ynski (1945: 142) presents indexes on the money and real earnrings of "white 
and coloured workers" for a similar period. They have not been reproduced here 
but are broadly in line with Table 1 and probably constitute a reworking of the 
same or similar data. Both sources need evaluation. 
du Plessis (1950: 50), s~humam (1938 : 248) 
By taking urban population figures in conjunction with participation rates, it 
should be possible to calculate the potential number of workers available for 
non-agricultural employment. Then, from a comparison with the rate of labour 
absorption in the sectors covered by the indices, plus an assumption about 
employment keeping pace with output in the services sector, one should obtain 
a measure of the growth of the labour surplus. Though rough, the calculation 
would be worth pursuing. 
1908 Transvaal Indigency Commission; 1913 Select Cormnittee on European 
Employment and Labour Conditions; 1916 Transvaal Relief and Grants-in-Aid 
Commission; l920/2l Unemployment Commission; 1925 Economic and Wage 
Commission; 1926 Committee on Poor Relief and Employment (~epartment of Labour) ; 
1928/29 Commission on Pensions and National Insurance; 1930 Inter-departmental 
Committee on the Labour Resources of the Union; 1930 Carnegie Commission on 
Poor Whites; 1932 Unemployment Investigation Committee. 
'IUnemployment had become very bad by the middle of 1933. Drought and the 
economic crisis had combined to drive thousands of Africans to the Witwatersrand. 
men the labour market on the mines was glutted for the first time in history. 
The authorities admitted that at least 5000 natives were unemployed on the 
Rand ... Thousands were in gaol for breaches of the pass and poll tax 
regulations. Thousands more, illegally resident in town, led a p3cecarious 
existence ... A member of the Johannesburg City Council ... declared that in 
October 1937, there were '93000 Natives in Johannesburg and on the Reef who live 
by their wits, sleep with their friends at night, and are not included in the 
censust." (~oux 61964: 2701.) 
The docwnentfs wording excites the suspicion that &S Kmger was put up to the 
job: by local politicians or professionals or even nascent Vrededorp 
capitalists . 
.There is no settled terminology in the historical literature. In part this is 
because flindwt~ialization" itself is an amorphous category, but by semi- 
convention France, Gemany and Japan are 'late" or follower examples, the 
countries of "recent settlementw listed in the text together with the 
Scandinavians are "intermediate", a d  the post-WWII cases "late-late 
industrializersn . (see Hirschman, 1968. ) 
"[What] has been called the trepoliticization of world economics 1 . . . means 
that the conventions which made it possible to segregate economic issues and 
to bargain about them without allowing the disputes to be dominated by 
extraneous po3.itical considerations are unlikely to continue to operate. Such 
segregation of zones of conflict is seen as a very special feature of the period 
covered by the present study [1959-19711. The reason given for the expected 
change is that the U.S. economic presence in the international system is no 
longer overwhelming. It can no longer impose the rules of the game." (RIII 
61976: 1351.) For a brief account of the late forties when the United States 
acquired this predominance, see Milward (1977 : ch. 10). 
For example, the refusal of the Botha-Smuts regime to venture state capital in 
iron and steel production. After much pressure and agitation - amply documented 
in ministerial archives - a Bounties Act was passed in 1922 providing for 
potential subsidies upon the initial output of such an industry. But no 
guaran.tees of interest or redemption payments were forthcoming, despite the 
willing participation of a number of foreign steel producers and at one time a 
British government agency: the Trade Facilities Advisory Board. Memorandum ... 
on the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (1923). 
m e  sterling .gold standard pm-1914, it is argued, was a mechanism which reacted 
to fluctuations internal to the British econoqy by placing the burden overseas: 
'T3efore 1914 London had been able to survive the cxises that followed each trade 
cycle explosion by pushing the main burden of adjustment on to other countries; 
since the First World War it has not been strong e n o w  to do this, and when a 
veritable cyclone came in 1931 it was inevitable that the international gold 
standard should break down ... people had too often said that London's financial 
strength before 1914 was due to the gold standard. The truth was rather that 
the strength of the gold standard was due to Londonfs international financial 
position. (~ayers [ 1957 : 981. ) 
This quotation from a leading academic proponent is representative. 'When the 
mining era draws to a close, the path to steady expansion will lie in the 
concentration of attention on the ... production, marketing and improvement of 
raw produce. Industrial development should take the form of the working up of 
South African raw materials, and the rate of development will depend upon the 
efficiency of the methods employed and on the cost of production ... Industrial 
development without tariff assistance may not be so spectaculax, but it is more 
secure, more healthy, and more widespread . , . l1 (plant 61927 : 49-50]. ) 
See Marks and Trapido (1979 : 61f). 
What is customarily described under the generic title of State Capitalism 
includes ... a number of species, very different in their social content and 
significance. The difference depends on. the form of the State, the condition 
of prevailing class relations, and the class interests which State policy 
serves. The common element in these various species is the coexistence of 
capitalist ownership and operation of production with a system of generalized 
controls over economic opera;tions exercised by the State, which pursues ends 
which are not identical with those of an individual firm. This system maJr or 
may not include a limited amount of nationalized and State-operated production." 
(~obb 61963: 3841.) A concurring source is Fitzgerald (1977). 
The indexes of manufacturing activity rose for (a) South Africa (base 1911 = 100) 
from 312 in 1920 to 999 in 1936-38; (b) the USSR (base 1913 = 100) from 135 in 
1926-29 to 774 in 19 56-38; and (c) base 1913 = 100) from 176 in 1920 to 
529 in 1936-38. For other at the terminal date lie mostly in 
the range of 150-200. (~eague of Nations 61945: 130-1.) These are figures of 
unknown accuracy, and the South African sector was, of course, considerably 
smaller than the other two cited. But the ordering is probably acceptable. 
A note on classification is necessary. Apart from minor changes of title, the 
Industrial Census breakdown into 18 "classes of industry" has been retained 
(XII and XI11 being amalgamated). These categories are unsatisfactory for 
numerous reasons. First, heat, light and power XIV and building and contracting 
XVI are not a logical part of the sector. In contemporary thinking (the ISIC 
classification) they axe divisions or sectors in their own right alongside 
agriculture,,mining, manufacturing, etc. Secondly, some classes are too diverse 
and aggregated. Metals and engineering IV combines machine production with 
crude metal fabrication, and food and drink V encompasses 23 product groups 
widely differing in sophistication and capital intensity. Thirdly, some 
categories are redundant or tiny (raw materials I and surgical instruments =I), 
while others growing in weight like rubber products are hidden in the 
miscellaneous class XVII. 
Li&t manufacturing includes food, beverages and tobacco; textiles, clothing 
and leather; wood products and flunitme; printing and publishing; and rubber 
and plastic products. Heaq industry comprises paper and paper products; 
chemicals; petroleum refineries and coal products; non-metallic mineral 
products (cement, glass, ceramics) ; basic metals; and fabricated metal 
products , machinery and equipment. 
Amongst a voluminous literature, see as examples BTI (1945), van Biljon (1939), 
Norval (1962)~ Brand (1976) and the sources cited by the latter. 
Knowles (1936) and Bruwer (1923) are reasonably full accounts, while Kaplan's 
paper contains a brief sketch (1976 : 73-6). 
Diaz-Ale jandro (1975 : 107-8). 
Short accounts are contained in the sources under fn 23. They are no less 
partisan than the mainstream critiques of tariff policy, and should be read 
with the same judicious eye. 
Eknployment expansion was the aim under the following provisions. 
(a) All goods subject to the tariff had two quoted rates. Normally the 
maximum was imposed, but if the industry concerned "maintained unsatisfactory 
labour conditionsll the minimum duty could be substituted by proclamation. 
(b) Suspended duties could be applied or withdrawn, i.e. to reward or to 
penalize industries for the fulfilment of or failure to meet conditions laid 
down, including job creation. 
(c) The whole or part of the duty on raw materials and intermediate products 
could be remitted by proclamation on the recommendation of the Board of Trade 
and Industries for my reasons, including labour matters, deemed pertinent: 
Section 12(1) (k) . 
(d) Similarly, Class XV of the tariff 'l. . . provides for the exclusion of 
particular manufacturers from the privilege of free admission of raw materials 
and rewsites under rebate, after investigation by the Board of Trade and 
Industries has shown that such manufacturers were maintaining unsatisfactory 
labour conditionsf1. (customs Tariff Commission Report 61936 : 1151 . ) 
Corden (1971) is a standard textbook treatment. An historical application of 
effective protection is Forrest Capie (1978) on the British tariff of the 
thirties. 
The usual fomla for estimation is: 
where . gj = the effective protection rate; 
t = the nominal tariff rate on the output; j 
= the 
ti 
11 l1 11 l1 input; 
a = coefficient of input i to output j. i j 
This is used for the Table 8 calculations. 
(29) Some looser speculation about this manufacturing branch is warranted. ' In other 
counkries, and historically, the food industry dominates the early stages of 
development because it plays an intermediary role between the primary sector and 
the markets for foodstuffs. Setting up and expansion are relatively easy because 
the technology is simple and skilled manpower requirements low. Internal 
migration from rural localities to cities, and therefore out of food production, 
implies llincreased domestic consumption of industrially processed food, because 
in an urban environment it is technically more difficult (owing to transport 
and storage requirements) to feed large masses of people with non-processed food 
delivered by primary producers, and because traditional modes of consumption are 
profoundly alteredn. (UNIDO 61979: 731 .) 
Applying this to South Africa raises the expectation that the food industry 
should have been relatively large in view of early urban concentration based 
upon mining activities. It does not appear to be so, and it is a tempting 
speculation that the political leverage of agricultural capital may be p& 
explanation. 
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Geographical income: a: per capita (1938 prices) 
1911-12 : 28 1921-22 : 21.7 1937-38 : 38.7 
1917-18 : 24.5 1928-29 : 31 1941-42 : 45 
1919-20 : 27.5 1931-32 : 25.4 1945-46 : 47 
- 
Source: Schunann (1972: 7) 
TABLE 4 
Manufacturing sector: employment in public*establishments 
White &E 96 White 
1924-25 17554. 100 21297 100 44% 
1927-28 19982 114 11442 54 64 I-' I-' 
I-' 
1928-29 20759 118 11882 56 64 I 
* Public establishments= 'Government, local government 
undertakings and railway workshops'. 
Source: Off ice of Census '& Statistics 1942 Special Report 
No. 154 Twenty-second Industrial Census 1938-39: Table 1. 
Pretoria: Government Printer 
- -- L - p - p p - - - ---- 
TABLE 3 
Estimbted numbers designated 'poor white' 1916-1932 
Persons 
Males. family heads or 
f amilies 
191 6 39000 ('indigent or 10400 ('heads of 
dood arme v ) families') 
67500 ( 'other 16600 ('heads of 
poor ' ) f amiliee * ) 
37000 ( 'without 
visible meane 
of support ' ) 
106000 ( 'without . 
adequate 
subeiatence' ) 
1921 120000 ('poor whites*) 
18160 ('males out of 
a job on the 
Censue day') 
1929/30 300000 ( 'very poor ' ) 
1931 220000 ('poorest 14200 ('males regist- 
12%') ered unemployed 
& on relief 




Growth of manufacturing sector output and employment 
Index of employment 




Sources: 1916 - Macmillan (1919:9) 
Official Year Book ( 1933 :l 73) 
onion- of South ~frica, ~overn- 
ment Adviser on Technical 
Education ( 191 7) 
Union of South Africa, 
Unemnloment Commiaaion 
Source: Calculated from office of Censue & Statistics 
Y r C e n s u s  of Industrial Establishments 1945-46 (29th 
IC): Table 25. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
(1927 :I) 
Carnegie Commiseion 1932:23 
{1932:23! 932:~ii, 24) 
%k% employment structure 1923/24-1938/32 Manufacturing sector 
Share of sectoral Ratio of 
Industry branch white emvloym. (%) black/white 
1923/24 1938/39 1923/24 1938/39 
;,zr%Jcipatiol~~f~dp-a~r&al br nches in the to t ;+L  increase in 
. -. 
rnc-~f szxgrin~ e p ~ ~ L ~ r ~ e n t  k value-adde* , -'!9?3!24- - 1938/39. 
- -- -- 
(periantagca rdrked by value-adde.i) 
IV Metals & engin- 27.9 29.6 1.2 1 .O 
eering Industry branch Emvloment Yalue-added 
(Total) (Yhite) XVI Building & 15.6 11.8 2.3 1.9 
construction 
Metals & engineering 28.0 31 .O 25.1 
V Food, beverages 11.3 10.2 3.0 2.2 
& tobacco Food, beverages & 10.1 9.2 14.0 
tobacco 
V11 Printing & 7.7 6.7 0.5 0.5 
Paper Heat, light & power 3.3 1.2 11.1 
Clothing & textiles 13.0 16.0 8.2 XIV Heat, light & 
power 
Building & construction 
Vehicles 
V1 Clothing & 
textiles 
Chemicals V111 Vehicles 
Cement, glass, brick & 
ceramics XV Leather & 
leatherware 
Paper & printing 
XI Chemicals, drugs 
& paints Rubber products & 
miscellaneous products 
111 Wood products 
Wood products 
Leather products X Furniture 
Furniture 
11 Cement, glass, 
bricks & ceramics Surgical instruments 
& jewellery 
XVII Rubber products & 
miscellaneous Raw material processing 
Ship & boat building I Raw material 
processing 
Sector total 
XI1 Surgical, dental 
& scientific 1 
XI11 Jewellery, time- 
pieces & platedware 
Source: calculated from 9th Industrial Census 1923-24, 
Table 14; 25th Industrial Census 1938-39, 
Tables 6 & 7. 
IX Ship & boat building 
Mean: 1.76 1.43 
Source: as for Table 6. 




Nominal and effective rates of protection, 1924 and 1939 
Products Nominal rates (%) 
1924 1939 
Grain milling 2 5 95 
Wheat meal/flour 24 44 
Maize meal 27 .. 172 
Rye etc meal 10 2 1 
Brewery products 43 60 
(Ale, beer, stout) 




Condensed milk 16 25 4 5 
Canning(Fruit, jam) 25 - 34 
Confectionary 28 3 5 
(Sweets, chocolates) 
Processed meat 18 
Bacon Be ham 18 
Baking prod;cts 18 
Princi~al inmts 




Sugar - 18 
Dried fruit 
Meat: fresh & froeen l 8  
Packing: cardboard 23 
cartons (printed) 
Effective rates (%) 
1924 1939 
Source: calculated from the Industrial Census and A n n M  State- 
-
ment8 of Trade & Shipping in the relevant years; 
Official Yearbooks 8 & 10; and BTI (1945: Annexure I). 
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. PETITION NO. 320 1924 
To the Honourable Speaker and Members of the House 
of Aseembly of the Union of South Africa, assembled 
in Parliament. 
The petition of the undersigned MARIA MAGDALENA 
KRUGER, housewife of 36 Warket Street, Newlands, 
and 255 other mothers and daughters, resident in 
Newlande, Greymont, Delarey and Westdene in the 
constituency Vrededorp - 
Submits with due respect that - 
l. the condition of g very large portion of the 
white population on the Witwatersrand, particularly 
in the constituency of Vrededorp, on Bccount of 
the extensive unemployment is extremely wretched 
and pitiful; 
I 
2. that the erection of factories, e.g. a tannery, P 
a shoe factory or a weaving mill or something P 
similar will greatly relieve the distress; P 
I 
3. that in the ward of Bewlands, Johannesburg, 
an area of 36 acres has been.made available for 
such enterprises, which the Honourable Government 
can utilise immediately; 
4. that a further measure of relief for the terrible 
condition of unemployment will undoubtedly be to 
declare intra vires the colour bar, which was 
recently declared ultra vires'. 
Your petitioners accordingly :pray that it may 
please your Honourable House .to consider the above 
favourably, and grant us such' relief of the wretched 
conditions which presently prevail as may be seen fit. 
And your petitioners will always dutifully pray, 
(Signed) W.M. xruger- and 255 others. 
Source: Archives of the Kinister of P.ines and Industries, 
--k1282/24. Pretoria: Central Archives. 
(TransIated from the Afrikaans) 
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